State-Level Public Opinion and Public Policy on LGBT Issues
In: Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics
"State-Level Public Opinion and Public Policy on LGBT Issues" published on by Oxford University Press.
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In: Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics
"State-Level Public Opinion and Public Policy on LGBT Issues" published on by Oxford University Press.
In: Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics
"The Evolution of Same-Sex Marriage Policy in the United States" published on by Oxford University Press.
In: Political research quarterly: PRQ ; official journal of the Western Political Science Association and other associations, Band 57, Heft 2, S. 305
ISSN: 1938-274X
In: Political research quarterly: PRQ ; official journal of Western Political Science Association, Pacific Northwest Political Science Association, Southern California Political Science Association, Northern California Political Science Association, Band 57, Heft 2, S. 305-314
ISSN: 1065-9129
In: Legislative studies quarterly, Band 29, Heft 3, S. 383-406
ISSN: 1939-9162
Theoretical work assumes that legislators use ex ante design to gain bureaucratic influence, not only at an agency's appointment stage but also as an ongoing tactic. Yet no empirical work has investigated whether or not legislators prefer to use design to exert influence after an agency's appointment stage. Using a mail survey of more than 2,500 legislators, we model legislators' preferences for ex ante design as a function of both institutional factors and individual legislators' characteristics. Our results suggest that the feasibility of agency design as an ongoing tactic of bureaucratic influence is more limited than theoretical work indicates and that both institutional‐ and individual‐level factors explain legislators' preferences.
In: Legislative studies quarterly, Band 29, Heft 3, S. 383-406
ISSN: 0362-9805
In: State politics & policy quarterly: the official journal of the State Politics and Policy section of the American Political Science Association, Band 9, Heft 4, S. 456-485
ISSN: 1946-1607
AbstractWhile previous work suggests that enacting coalitions' use of ex ante control devices shapes future legislatures' incentives to intervene in the bureaucracy, it is less clear how such insulation motivates individual legislators. We advance an individual-level account of how legislative rule review, a control device that structures an agency's insulation from political interference, differentially shapes legislators' preferences for direct and statutory intervention tactics. Using an original survey of U.S. state legislators, we find that insulation reduces the expected policy benefits of direct interventions, making these tactics less attractive to legislators. Moreover, to capitalize on more permeable agency design, legislators must have access to key resources. For statutory tactics, insulation has no effect on legislators' intervention preferences. Our findings suggest that insulation is a durable control device that casts a long shadow in protecting an enacting coalition's interest in agency affairs.
In: State politics & policy quarterly: the official journal of the State Politics and Policy Section of the American Political Science Association, Band 9, Heft 4, S. 456-485
ISSN: 1532-4400
While previous work suggests that enacting coalitions' use of ex ante control devices shapes future legislatures' incentives to intervene in the bureaucracy, it is less clear how such insulation motivates individual legislators. We advance an individual-level account of how legislative rule review, a control device that structures an agency's insulation from political interference, differentially shapes legislators' preferences for direct and statutory intervention tactics. Using an original survey of U.S. state legislators, we find that insulation reduces the expected policy benefits of direct interventions, making these tactics less attractive to legislators. Moreover, to capitalize on more permeable agency design, legislators must have access to key resources. For statutory tactics, insulation has no effect on legislators' intervention preferences. Our findings suggest that insulation is a durable control device that casts a long shadow in protecting an enacting coalition's interest in agency affairs. Adapted from the source document.
In: American review of politics, Band 34, Heft fall-winter, S. 245-270
ISSN: 1051-5054
In: International studies perspectives: a journal of the International Studies Association, Band 13, Heft 2, S. 195-211
ISSN: 1528-3577
In: International studies perspectives: ISP, Band 13, Heft 2, S. 195-210
ISSN: 1528-3585